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ABSTRACT 
Researcher: Yoko Kunii 
Title: Student Pilot Situational Awareness: The Effects of Trust in 
Technology 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Science in Aeronautics 
Year: 2006 
The purpose of this research was to evaluate the general level of trust in technology in 
student pilots and then to determine the relationship between pilots' trust and their 
situational awareness during simulated flight. A literature review revealed that the 
Jian Trust Scale was based on empirical observations and had precedence in the 
literature so it was selected. Since excessive reliance on technology can make the 
operator passive and unquestioning, ultimately loss of situational awareness may 
result. The main hypothesis tested was to establish the relationship between 
measurements of trust on the ground and situational awareness in simulated flight; 
pilots who had lower-trust in technology were expected to have to maintain higher 
levels of situational awareness. Conversely, higher-trust pilots were expected to have 
lower situational awareness due to an over reliance on the equipment. Instructor pilots 
rated the 30 students in simulated flight using a modified Situation Awareness Global 
Assessment Techniques (SAGAT) score and this was compared to their Trust score 
derived from ground based testing. The results were opposite from those expected but 
significant facts were discovered. The pilots with the highest trust scores showed the 
best situational awareness. This study concludes that the trust is not blind in ERAU 
pilots, they seem to trust the instruments and yet also maintain good situational 
awareness. The results were not as clear for the middle trust scoring pilots and 
suggests that trust and situational awareness are not as related. The need for 
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monitoring situational awareness is discussed and the use of a simple and rapid 
ground based trust score may indicate which students would most benefit from 
improving their situational awareness would be the middle scorers on a trust scale. 
The simplicity of this approach to identifying those in need of improving situational 
awareness and the successful prediction of high trusting pilots and good situational 
awareness, suggests that a better trust scale, one geared specifically for general 
aviation, would be useful. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii 
ABSTRACT iv 
LIST OF TABLES viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ix 
LIST OF ACRONYMS x 
Chapter 
I INTRODUCTION 1 
Problem Statement 8 
II REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 10 
FAA/Industry Training Standard Criteria 11 
Trust in Automation 12 
Definitions of Trust 14 
A Model of Trust and Reliance in Automation 20 
Trust and Self-Confidence 21 
Trust and Multitasking Demand Situations 22 
Trust and Passive Tasks 22 
Appropriate Trust: Trust and System Capability 24 
Measurement of Trust between Human and Machine 24 
Situational Awareness 28 
Enemies of Situational Awareness 31 
vi 
Single-pilot Resource Management 33 
Aeronautical Decision Making 33 
Automation Cockpit 35 
Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique 35 
Hypothesis 38 
ffl METHODOLOGY 39 
Research Techniques 39 
Study I: Jian's Trust Survey 39 
Study II: Evaluation of Trust and Situational Awareness 41 
IV RESULTS 45 
Study I: Jian's Trust Survey 45 
Study II: Evaluation of Trust and Situational Awareness 48 
Situational Awareness Evaluation 48 
Trust vs. Situational Awareness 49 
V DISCUSSION 51 
VI CONCLUSION 55 
VII RECOMMENDATIONS 56 
REFERENCES 58 
APPENDIXES 63 
A. JIAN'S TRUST SCALE 65 
B. SITUATIONAL AWARENESSS EVALUATION SHEETS 68 
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Proposed Relationship between Different Dimensions of Trust 18 
2. Results of Jian's Original Trust Scale 44 
3. Results of Modified Jian's Trust Scale 44 
viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1. A conceptual model of the dynamic process that governs trust and its effect on 
reliance 19 
2. Model of Appropriate Trust in Automation 24 
3. Pilot Decisions Making Model 29 
4. Histogram of Original Trust Survey Results 29 
5. Histogram of Modified Trust Survey Results 29 
6. Histogram of Situational Awareness Scores 48 
7. Average Trust vs. Situational Awareness 50 
ix 
















Aeronautical Decision Making 
Air Traffic Control 
Crew Resource Management 
Global Positioning Systems 
Federal Aviation Administration 
FAA Industrial Training Standard 
Instrument Flight Rules 
Line Oriented Flight Training 
Multi Function Displays 
National Airspace System 
Primary Function Displays 
Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique 
Single Resource Management 
Technically Advanced Aircraft 





Background and Significance 
The ability of pilots to maintain situational awareness, the awareness of their 
position and direction in space, their proximity to the ground and other aircraft, are 
critical to their survival and that of their passengers. Even the best trained and most 
experienced pilots can make poor decisions, and these poor decisions are spawned from 
poor situational awareness (Endsley, 1990). A new generation of aircraft is emerging 
with technical aids to navigation that measurably improve situational awareness with 
enhanced, real-time computerized displays of aircraft and navigation information. If 
operating correctly, these instruments remarkably improve pilot situational awareness 
(SA) and promise to improve safety of flight. What if these instruments fail however, and 
worse, what if their failure is not complete and inaccurate information is still 
communicated? Worse still, what if the pilot does not notice this error because of a trust 
in the accuracy and reliability of the computerized equipment? This paper concerns itself 
with how levels of trust placed in technology affect situational awareness. The study aims 
to bring to light risks that may arise as a result of too much trust in technology; situations 
that may arise when the pilot is lulled into a false sense of complete security in the 
computerized display. There may be an improvement in situational awareness but is there 
a cost in the event of over reliance on our computers. 
"Situational awareness" is formally defined as "a perception of the environment 
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the 
projection of their status in the near future" (Endsley, 1988, p. 97). All of the incoming 
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data from aircraft systems, the outside environment, fellow crew members, other aircraft, 
and Air Traffic Control must be brought together into an integrated whole. Situational 
awareness is a critical mental process, and it affects decision-making and performance 
(Endsley, 1996). 
Workload and distraction also are critical tasks management skills, particularly 
to single pilot resource management of the flight operation. Task delegation to 
automation systems is time-saving for the pilot, particularly with increased workload or 
increased distractions. Collecting all the information from all the available resources is an 
essential piloting ability, and at the same time accurate data interpretation is equally 
important. Keen attention to detail could save time in detecting an error. In high workload 
environments, attention is consumed by the situation and errors may go undetected, 
particularly errors that are not annunciated well. Some pilots may be more susceptible to 
this failure to notice errors, just like pilots seem to differ in their level of situational 
awareness. 
Endsley stresses that situational awareness constructs can be broken down into 
three levels: perception of the situation (Level 1), comprehension of the situation (Level 
2), and projection of future (Level 3) (Endsley 1988). Understanding and quickly 
interpreting the current situation status as well as projecting the future are also critical to 
maintaining the pilots' situational awareness. Anticipating what will happen with the 
plane, the path, and the people involved if the current situation continues are also key in 
maintaining high levels of situational awareness. Considering what to do if he or she has 
to make a missed approach, if the weather deteriorates at the destination are important. 
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It may be possible to improve situational awareness by training. Situational 
awareness training may take place through Crew Resource Management (CRM), Line 
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), and emergency exercise training. Even the most 
experienced and talented pilots can make the wrong decision if they have inaccurate 
situational awareness. This applies to noticing equipment malfunction as well as noticing 
position and future position in space. Conversely, a pilot may accurately understand what 
is occurring in the environment yet not know the correct action to take or be unable to 
carry out that action (Endsley, 1990), particularly if given the wrong information. 
Finally, highly- automated craft are entering the general aviation fleet in large 
numbers. Aircraft equipped with highly automated systems such as Global Positioning 
Systems (GPS), Primary (PFD) and Multi Function Displays (MFD) are made to improve 
safety and are appearing in unprecedented numbers for a new technology. General 
aviation pilots can be expected to have more experience in automated aircraft from the 
earliest periods of flight so that they will be able to easily transition to airline pilot 
training; however, such aircraft may create a different level of human error. The AOPA 
Air Safety Foundation (2005) has already found that a higher percentage of low-time 
pilots are having accidents in highly- automated aircraft. Our culture accepts automation 
and computers as infallible. This is a problem because automation takes over many 
piloting responsibilities and dependence on the system may compromise situational 
awareness. For example, pilots believe the machine is doing its job very well, and peruse 
other tasks inside the cockpit while monitoring is overlooked. The degree to which a pilot 
trusts his equipment, particularly technical electronic equipment, might be measurable. 
Pilots prone to passive system monitoring might be forewarned by an individual 
4 
evaluation of their trust level. For example, if a pilot takes a simple simulator test in an 
automated aircraft their trust level can be assessed and scored so that the pilot can take 
corrective action before a problem occurs. 
Much of today's flight training is oriented towards enhancing situational 
awareness. Improving situational awareness for general aviation pilots may improve 
aviation safety overall. General Aviation pilots with 100 to 500 hours of total time have 
contributed the greatest number of accidents (Wells, 1992). According to Trollip and 
Jensen (1991)'s profile, there is a period between 100 to 500 hours in which pilots' 
confidence level exceeds their ability level. They also suggested two periods that are 
particularly dangerous: (1) approximately 100 hours, after the pilot has accumulated 
about 50 hours beyond the private pilot's certificate, and (2) between 50 to 100 hours 
after earning an instrument rating. Those two periods are marked by an increase in 
confidence without a substantial experience gain. It appears that an appropriate 
situational awareness training intervention strategy would be necessary at this stage, after 
basic flight skills have been acquired but an in-depth level of expertise on which to build 
situational awareness has not yet been accumulated (Endsley, Garland, & Georgia, 2000). 
Automation was developed to help improve aviation safety by relieving pilot 
workload thereby, presumably, enhancing situation awareness. For single pilot operation, 
automation systems such as GPS, MFD, and the other advanced avionics make effective 
decisions for the pilot and help reduce the pilot's workload. Some automation systems are 
amazingly intelligent and help make a decision for a pilot. However, these systems are 
only decision-making aids to help pilots. The pilots still remain as final decision makers. 
Furthermore, those automation systems fail from time to time. If a pilot depends on a 
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system too much and does not pay attention to clues that the system may not be working 
properly, the pilot will interpret the data as accurate. Good situational awareness should 
include some skepticism about the information the pilot receives, whether from the 
pilot's biological sensory systems, as in the case of disorientation, or in the case of 
system disorientation from instrument failure. 
Automation seems like it is making pilots become less perceptive. Bergeron 
(1981) noted that pilots working with increased levels of automation in an autopilot were 
more likely to lose track of where they are (Endsley & Kiris, 1995). This fact is called the 
man-out-of-the-loop performance problem. According to Endsley and Kiris (1995), the 
out-of-the-loop performance problem is a major potential consequence of automation. 
This leaves operators of automated systems handicapped in their ability to take over 
manual operations in the event of automation failure. System operators working with 
automation have been found to have a diminished ability both to detect system errors and 
subsequently to perform tasks manually in the face of automation failures, compared with 
operators who manually perform the same tasks (Endsley, Bolte & Jones, 2003). 
There are many other potential dangers with the use of the automation systems, 
including mode misunderstandings and errors, failures to understand automation 
behavior, confusion or lack of awareness concerning what automated systems are doing 
and why, and difficulties tracing the functioning or reasoning process of automated 
agents (Billings, 1996; Sarter & Woods, 1993). Research into the relationship between 
human use of technology and trust of that technology has found a relationship between 
task workload and trust. A review by Biros, Daly and Gunsch (2004) found that at high 
workload levels there tends to be an over reliance on automation. Overtrust in automation 
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has produced errors in many settings such as target detection and system failures 
(Wickens, Conejo, and Gempler, 1999; Mosier, Skitka, Heers, and Burdick, 1998). There 
are similar conclusions drawn from medicine in which automation is increasingly 
producing diagnostic decision aides for medical personnel (Wiegmann, Rich, Zhang, 
2001). 
Pilots' trust in automation would seem to have a great influence on the likelihood 
of catching and correcting an equipment malfunction. Similarly, it may follow that the 
pilot who has a high level of trust in the automated equipment may begin to omit tasks 
that should be monitored because the pilot overly trusts the equipment. This action may 
allow the pilot to overlook important situational information. There is no clear way to 
demonstrate how much trust a pilot needs toward a system; however, trusting a system 
too much will affect the operator's situational awareness, will create an over-reliance. If a 
pilot over-trusts the systems, he/she may misperceive the instruments, may rarely look at 
the instruments, and may mistakenly interpret data. Assuming that the system is highly 
reliable could make pilots passive, and the systems are less likely to monitor. As pilot 
becomes a passive monitor, they may tend not to notice when the systems are not 
working properly or even may miss the information due to inattention. If the pilot's trust 
changes the way pilots perform tasks, interacts with the equipment and makes decisions, 
his/her trust may influence the usage of other resources such as traditional instruments, 
weather, Air Traffic Control, other crew members, and many other resources available to 
the pilot (Endsley, Bolte & Jones, 2003). 
Trust has been studied mostly in the social psychology field (Jian, Bisantz & 
Drury, 2000). Rather than human- to- human trust, Jian, Bisaniz, and Drury (2000) 
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studied trust between human and machine. The trust scale that was used in this study was 
basically for measuring trust levels between human and machine in general. They 
developed a trust scale for measuring human-machine trust through a very thorough word 
selection based on their elaborate experiments. 
Endsley (1987) introduced the Situation Awareness Global Assessment 
Technique (SAGAT) to assess situational awareness across all of its elements based on a 
comprehensive assessment of operator situational awareness requirements. It allows one 
to measure operators' situational awareness subjectively, and it is able to obtain data of 
the operators' current perceptions of the situation. So far this technique is the most 
effective and subjective measurement of pilots' situational awareness. 
The data from those two measurements, one of trust and one of SAGAT will be 
compared to observe whether trust level affects pilots' situational awareness. Measuring 
trust itself is already a big challenge. The benefits of attempting this approach are clear. If 
trust towards flight automation can be measured in a pilot, that is if over reliance on 
instruments can be ascertained, and if a relationship between trust and situational 
awareness can be determined then it may be possible to assess situational awareness from 
trust scales alone, on the ground. Pilots could be alerted that they may have an over 
reliance on their systems, the might trust too much and fail to notice an instrument 
malfunction or may miss important information because they know the machines are 
taking care of it. The machines may have great situational awareness but an over trusting 
pilot may not. This would be a new way of measuring situational awareness toward 
systems and could be a convenient new tool for pilots' training, building a healthy 
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skepticism regarding automation and reducing the reliance on automation for critical 
monitoring tasks. Trust the instruments certainly, but not blindly. 
This study will help understand and will attempt to predict patterns of automation 
bias based on a pilots' level of trust. This study may lead to the development of a trust 
scale between human and computerized aircraft systems. 
Problem Statement 
A pilot's trust in automation systems is related to the effective use of such 
systems. Bias caused by the pilot's trust in the machine may significantly affect their 
situational awareness. Since many student pilots are not familiar with monitoring and 
controlling the multiple tasks presented in today's complex automated flight systems, it 
could be difficult for them to maintain high levels of situational awareness. In high 
workload conditions, pilots' over-reliance may have a great impact on their use of the 
automations systems. The relationship between a pilot's trust level for automated systems 
and their reliance on the instruments might indicate their level of potential situational 
awareness in flight. A pilot predisposed to trust computers may be less likely to observe 
them and may miss information that provides for good situational awareness. 
This research investigated the relationships between student pilots' trust of 
aircraft systems (not limited to automation) and their situational awareness. The trust 
level of student pilots will be measured on the ground, and compared with their 
situational awareness in real-time simulated flight. Correlations between trust and 
situational awareness will then be determined. It is expected that pilots who overtrust 
their automated instruments will not attend to them as well and will be deficient in their 
situational awareness. The end result will hopefully be helpful in raising the competency 
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of general aviation pilots by determining the degree to which trust in automation may 
affect their situational awareness. 
10 
CHAPTER n 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The advance of computer processing power and information display systems are 
evident in technically advanced aircraft, and have redefined many tasks for humans. For 
example, the analog gauges that grew up with the airplane and became standardized are 
rapidly being replaced by computerized displays that are more accurate, informative and 
reliable. With the proper training, these new aircraft displays promise to reduce the 
burden and tedium of many piloting and navigation demands on the pilot and make 
general aviation safer. This is the goal of the FAA Industry Training Standard (FITS) 
project, to facilitate the introduction of cockpit automation through training 
recommendations and improve general aviation safety (Landsberg, 2003). However, the 
introduction of automation may have hidden dangers for pilot performance by 
encouraging an over reliance on automation, what has been called 'overtrust' of 
automation (Davision, Wickens, 2001). Pilots may be lulled into underactivity and fail to 
monitor completely automated systems on their displays or overtrust these instruments 
during high workload conditions while their attention is drawn elsewhere. This could lead 
to a diminution of the improvement in situational awareness expected in technically 
advanced aircraft (TAA). 
TAA are entering the general aviation fleet in large numbers (AOPA Air Safety 
Foundation, 2005, p. 1). TAA are identified as aircraft that are sufficiently different from 
traditional general aviation aircraft in navigation and instruments particularly in the use 
of computerized displays (AOPA Air Safety Foundation, 2005). FAA's TAA Safety 
Study Team (2003) defined a TAA as "an aircraft that has at a minimum: Instrument 
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Flight Rules (IFR) certified Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation equipment 
(navigator) with a moving map; or a multi-function display (MFD) with weather, traffic 
or terrain graphics; and an integrated autopilot (p. 9)." In general, the pilot interfaces with 
one or more computers in order to aviate, navigate, or communicate in TAA (FAA TAA 
Safety Study Team, 2003). The AOPA Air Safety Foundation (2005) defined a TAA with 
a cockpit equipped with new generation avionics that takes full advantage of computing 
capability, and modern navigational aids to improve pilot positional awareness, system 
redundancy, in-cockpit information. 
Most TAA aircraft are older, traditional general aviation aircraft that have 
undergone a transformation through substantial navigation, communication, and display 
system (avionics) upgrades. In addition, "new-production" TAAs, such as the Cirrus 
Design Corporation (Cirrus) SR 20 and SR 22 and the Columbia Aircraft Company 
350/400, are entering the fleet in increasing numbers (FAA TAA Safety Study Team., 
2003) 
The TAA conversion goes beyond just equipment. The larger definition includes, 
a new mindset for pilots, encompassing a revised view of what constitutes general 
aviation flying. Flying TAA is flying with airline style procedures, regular use of the 
autopilot, and greater dependence on avionics for multi tasking beyond pure navigation 
(AOPA Air Safety Foundation, 2005). 
The TAA is a high-tech aircraft made to improve safety, yet this aircraft creates 
a different level of human errors. TAA Safety Study Team. (2003) states that typical 
problems occurred after previous introductions of new aircraft technology. TAA also 
reflect typical general aviation pilot judgment errors found in analysis of non-TAA 
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related accidents. The AOPA Air Safety Foundation (2005) has found that a higher 
percentage of low time pilots are having accidents in TAA. This team observed that in 
some cases, pilots tended to have an unwarranted over reliance on their equipment which 
they believed would compensate for their piloting shortcomings. System management 
skills must come with basic stick and rudder skills; they concluded. 
FAA/Industry Training Standard Criteria 
FAA/Industry Training Standard (FITS) is a joint research program developing 
general aviation pilot training in TAA. TAA require an emphasis on realistic, scenario-
based training to develop the higher- order thinking skills required to reduce the number 
of general aviation accidents and incidents. The goals of FITS also include improving 
pilot knowledge on safely, competently, and efficiently operating technically advanced 
piston or light jet aircraft in the modern National Airspace System (FAA/Industry 
Training Standards, 2004). 
In order to achieve these goals, and to account for the TAA recently introduced 
in general aviation, a new training style must be adopted. Specific training goals include 
enhancing higher-order thinking skills, including aeronautical decision-making (ADM), 
situational awareness, and pattern recognition (FAA/Industry Training Standards, 2004). 
Other skills included within the FITS training goals are automation competence, planning 
and execution, procedural knowledge, and psychomotor skills (FAA/Industry Training 
Standards, 2004). 
Trust in Automation 
Computer-assisted technologies are growing at an accelerated pace in aircraft, 
ocean vessels, healthcare and elsewhere in complex technical environments where human 
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failure might be relieved. The opposite side of that reduction in human error these 
systems promise is over trust and the growing phenomenon of complacency in systems 
operations (Atoyan, Duquet and Robert, 2006). The level of trust has been shown to be a 
primary influence on successfully using automation systems (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 
2000). There is no evidence how much trust is too much or how much is not enough. 
There are many automation- related accidents or mishaps in commercial aviation. In 1972, 
an Eastern Airlines aircraft accident may have been the result of an automation omission 
error. While the crew was determining the reason why the landing gear indicators did not 
work even though the landing gears were down, the crew was unaware the autopilot was 
disengaged until prompted by Air Traffic Control to check their altitude. By the time they 
had descended to 30 ft above ground level, it was too late to make a correction (Billlings, 
1996). 
In 1983, Korean Airlines 007 flew into Soviet airspace, and was shot down by 
Soviet fighters. The crew did not follow their intended flight-path; instead they 
maintained a magnetic heading until they were destroyed as a threat. The crew was 
relying entirely on automation. Although the automation system had been inappropriately 
set up, the crew never checked their progress manually ("Analysis of Flight Data," 1993). 
If the operators do not trust the automation system, the systems will likely be unused. The 
operators will lose the benefits for which the systems were designed. On the other hand, 
overused and overly automated systems may be monitored less frequently (Muir & 
Moray, 1996). Even if occasional faults occur, the trust in automation can continue to be 
a profound influence on decision making of an operator (Lee & See, 2004). These 
automation biases could create serious problems in situational awareness, and ultimately 
affect the crews' decision-making process. Automation bias needs to be removed in order 
to have effective situational awareness that aids the decision-making process (Mosier, 
Skitka, Heers, & Burdick, 1998). 
Definitions of "Trust" 
Madsen and Gregor (2000) define "trust in automation" as "the extent to which a 
user is confident in and willing to act on the basis of the recommendations, actions and 
decisions of a computer-based tool or decision aid". It is important to point out that the 
"trust" referred to here is the "trust in automation" not the term for human- to- human 
relationships. Some researchers focus on "trust" as an attitude or expectation, and they 
tend to define "trust" in one of the following ways: "Expectancy held by an individual 
that the word, promise or written communication of another can be relied upon" (Rotter, 
1976, p. 651), "[An] expectation related to subjective probability an individual assigns to 
the occurrence of some set of future events" (Rempel et al., p. 95), "[An] expectation of 
technically competent role performance" (Barber, 1983, p. 14), or "[An] expectation of 
fiduciary obligation and responsibility, that is, the expectation that some others in our 
social relationships have moral obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special 
concern for others' interests above their own" (Barber, p. 14). These definitions all 
include the element of expectation regarding behaviors or outcomes. Clearly, trust is 
concerned with expectancy or an attitude regarding the likehood of favorable responses. 
Another outcome approach characterizes trust as an intention or willingness to act. This 
goes beyond attitude, in that trust is characterized as an intention to behave in a certain 
manner or to enter into a state of vulnerability. For example, "trust" has been defined as a 
"willingness to place oneself in a relationship that establishes or increases vulnerability 
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with the reliance upon someone or something to perform as expected" (Johns, 1996, p. 
81), a "willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence" 
(Moorman et al , 1993, p. 82), and a "willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the truster, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that party" 
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p. 172). "Vulnerability" is identified as a critical 
factor of trust. Individuals must willingly put themselves at risk or in vulnerable positions 
by delegating responsibility for actions to another party (Lee & See, 2004). 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) introduced a framework in which behaviors result 
from intentions, and those intentions are functions of attitudes. Attitudes in turn are based 
on beliefs. According to the framework, "Beliefs and perceptions represent the 
information base that determines attitudes. The availability of information and the 
persons' experiences influences beliefs. An attitude is an affective evaluation of beliefs 
that guide people to adopt a particular intention. Intentions then translate into behavior, 
according to the environmental and cognitive constraints a person faces" (Lee & See, p. 
53). Moreover, trust is an attitude, and reliance is a behavior. This framework keeps 
beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behavior conceptually distinct and can help explain the 
influence of trust on reliance. Trust affects reliance as an attitude rather than as a belief, 
intention, or behavior (Lee & See). 
Castelfranchi and Falcon (1998) studied the relationships among trust, reliance, 
and delegation. They quoted the definition of "trust" from Gambetta: "'Trust' is the 
subjective probability by which an individual, A, expects that another individual, B, 
performs a given action on which its welfare depends." Castelfranchi and Falcon stressed 
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that trust is a mental state and an attitude towards another agent. It is basically an 
estimation, an opinion, an evaluation, i.e. a belief. Additionally, they described that 
"reliance" is necessary for the mental state, and only "delegation" is necessary for the 
action of relying and trusting (Castelfranchi & Falcon). 
The delegation process may also play an important role in the relationships 
between human and automation systems as a part of the decision-making process. The 
definition of delegation by Castelfranchi and Falcon is that A trusts both in B's ability 
and predictability in order to achieve A's goal. Strong delegation depends on B's 
awareness of A's intention to exploit his action; normally it is based on B's adapting to 
A's goal. There are many critical factors influencing the trust process. 
Beber (1993) defined "trust between human and machine" as "our general 
expectation of the persistence of the natural physical order, the natural order, and the 
moral social order, and our specific expectation of technically competent role 
performance from those involved with us in social relationships and systems." Based on 
these definitions, Muir (1994) proposed that human-machine trust has three stages of 
development: predictability, dependability, and faith. Humans develop trust in a machine 
by determining its consistency and desirability of its repeated behavior over a given 
period of time. The predictability leads to dependability as the relationship develops. 
Based on these two stages, faith develops. Humans develop faith only after working with 
a machine for a significant amount of time (Muir 1994). After working with the machine 
long enough to become familiar with it and one sees that it can operate it without any 
supervision, his or her dependability will be changed, depending on how many failures he 
or she faces during the machine operation. If the machine always works appropriately, 
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one will predict the machine is highly reliable. 
Based on Barber's and Rempel et al.'s sociologist definitions of "trust", Muir 
(1989) defined "trust" as the subjective expectation of future performance and described 
three types of expectation related to the three dimensions of trust: persistence in 
upholding natural and moral laws, technically competent performance, and fiduciary 
responsibility. According to Barber, persistence in upholding natural and moral laws is 
the basis of the other two dimensions, and providing a foundation of trust is attained by 
establishing constancy in the fundamental natural and moral laws. This stage reflects the 
belief that'... the heavens will not fall,' and that *... my fellow man is good, kind, and 
decent' (Barber, p. 9, and Lee & Moray, 1992). 
On the other hand, technically competent performances support expectations of 
future performance, based on capabilities, knowledge, or expertise (Lee & Moray). This 
dimension seeks the ability of the other partner to produce consistent and desirable 
performance (Lee & Moray). The last dimension of trust, "fiduciary responsibility", is 
concerned with the expectation that people have moral and social obligations to hold the 
interests of others above their own. This added dimension extends the idea of trust being 
based on performance to trust being based on moral obligations and intentions. These 
expectations depend on an assessment of the intentions and motivations of the partner, 
rather than past performance, or perceived capabilities (Lee & Moray, 2004). 
In addition to Barber's dimension of trust, Muir incorporated Rempel et al.fcs 
three dimensions of trust: predictability, dependability, and faith. According to Muir, 
these three dimensions of trust represent the dynamic nature of trust. As a result of 
changes in experience, trust develops in relationships. For example, predictability is a 
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foundation of the trust process in an early relationship. "Predictability" refers to the 
consistency and desirability of past behavior, and the predictability becomes the basis of 
the next stage, dependability. "Dependability" becomes the second basis of trust, and 
refers to an understanding df the stable characteristics of the partner's behavior. Faith is 
the final basis of trust and will be built based on the first two dimensions of trust, 
predictability and dependability. "Faith" is the belief in the extended behavior and must 
go beyond any available evidence. In a human-to-human relationship, it may take years 
to develop a relationship where a human partner understands the intentions of the other 
partner (Lee & Moray, 1994). 
Table 1 is a matrix showing how each dimension described by Remple et al., 
Barber, and Zuboff (1988) corresponds to each other in four different stages of trust. The 
four stages of trust are foundation, performance, process, and purpose. The first stage is 
the foundation of trust, representing the fundamental assumption of natural and social 
order that makes the other levels trust of possible. The second stage is performance. The 
performance stage focuses on the expectation of consistent, stable, and desirable 
performance or behavior. The third is process, which depends on an understanding of 
quality and characteristics of the systems and knowing how the system behaves. The final 
stage is purpose, which means, knowing the system designer's intention in creating the 
system (Lee & Moray, 1994). 
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Table 1 
Proposed relationship between different dimensions of trust by Lee and Moray 1994 
Barber (1 983) Rempel, Holmes, Zuboff (1 988) 
and Zanna (1 985) 
Purpose Fiduciary Faith Leap of faith 
responsibility 
Process Dependability Understanding 
Performance Technically Predictability Traihand-error 
competent experience 
performance 
Fundation Persistance of 
natural laws 
Rempel and Barber both include a very similar role to describe the purpose 
stage; faith and fiduciary responsibility correspond very closely to each other, and they 
are based on expectations of underlying motives and intentions. Predictability 
corresponds very closely to technically competent performance, and both cases depend 
on how stable and desirable the system is (Lee & Moray, 1994). The only difference is 
how much experience the operator has. A technically competent performance will be 
more experienced and knowledgeable about the machine. 
Definitions of trust in new technology is described by Zuboff (1988) coincide 
with the dimensions of trust provided by Barber and Rempel et al. According to Zuboff, 
trial-and-error corresponds very closely to predictability. Both cases describe the 
expectations of how consistent and stable the machine is and determine the desirability of 
its performance or behavior. Understanding and dependability are very similar ideas. 
Both describe the expectation of future behavior through an understanding of the 
partner's stable characteristics. Faith and leap of faith seem to be closely related. In the 
case of trust between human and machine, an operator may trust the machine without 
approved experience and evidence. The differences between faith and leap of faith will 
depend on the operators experience on the machine (Lee & Moray, 1994). 
A Model of Trust and Reliance on Automation 
Dzindolet, et al (2002) developed a model in Figure 1. It explains the framework 
of trust among humans and addresses the factors affecting trust and the role of trust in 
mediating reliance on automation. Trust and its effect on behavior depend on a dynamic 
interaction among the operator, context, automation, and interface. Trust also combines 
attitude with subjective workload, effort engaged, perceived risk, and self-confidence to 
form the intention to rely on the automation. There is an important decision involved in 
the operator's need to intervene or delegate the automation systems. Once the decision is 
made, factors such as time constraint and configuration errors may affect how much the 
operator actually relies on the automation. It is possible to say that the decision to rely on 
the automation depends on the type of the automation as well as the context. The 
operator's reliance on the automation may be influenced by environmental variability, 
such as weather conditions, and a history of inadequate maintenance. Those factors make 
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Figure 1. A Conceptual Model of the Dynamic Process that Governs Trust and its Effect 
on Reliance by Dzindolet et al. (2002) 
Trust and Self Confidence 
Self-confidence is a critical factor in decision-making (Bandura, 1982; Gist & 
Mitchell, 1992). Self-confidence is a particularly important variable that interacts with 
trust to influence reliance. Just as operators' trust in automation may influence their 
reliance on automation; also too much self-confidence can influence their reliance on 
manual control. If the operators' self-confidence fails to correspond to their actual 
abilities, then they may allocate automation inappropriately, just as mistrust may lead to 
an inappropriate allocation strategy. Operators would become less likely to change 
allocation strategies and delegate control to automation. If operators consistently 
overestimate their capabilities, then they are likely to maintain manual control, failing to 
benefit from the capabilities of the automation (Moray & Lee, 1992). 
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Trust and Multitasking Demand Situations 
In multi-tasking and demanding situations, the operators' trust can influence 
reliance. Generally people are not good at passive monitoring information for long 
periods of time (Endsley, Bolte & Jones, 2003). In a previous study of automation 
problems, 81% of reported problems in cruise were associated with not monitoring the 
systems (Moisier, Skitka, & Korte, 1994). When the operators have highly reliable 
automation combined with the responsibility for multiple tasks, in addition to monitoring 
the automation, this situation can lead to over-trust in automation and undermine the 
detection of automation failures (Parasuraman, Molly, & Singh, 1993). On the other 
hand, when the operators' only task was to monitor the automation, they detected failures 
effectively (Thackray & Touchstone, 1989). 
Trust and Passive Tasks 
According to Cownan (1988) and Slameck and Graf (1978), the very act of 
becoming passive in the processing of information may be inferior to active processing 
(Endsley, Bolte, & Jones, 2003, p. 178). It is almost impossible for a pilot to fully process 
or update the information which he/she is monitoring in working memory, though the 
information is appropriate (Endsley, Bolte, & Jones, 2003). For example, in the case 
which involved remembering how to get from point A to B by someone's driving, he 
would try hard to remember the direction if he knows that he has to drive back from B to 
A alone. Checking a computer manually, if it is adding correctly, is almost impossible 
without performing the calculation oneself. Therefore, monitoring and checking an 
automated system may be only partial attempts at a manual performance of the same task 
(Endsley, Bolte, & Jones, 2003). 
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A pilot who has high skills in the monitoring/scanning stage still has many 
chances to lose his/her second level of situational awareness which is comprehension of 
the situation due to the complexity of the automation systems. No matter how vigilant the 
pilot is, in some cases it is almost impossible to understand and interpret correctly what 
the automation systems are doing. Endsley, Bolte, and Jones (2003) states that 
compliancy or over-reliance on automation may not be directive cause of the 
out-of-the-loop syndrome, but a fundamental difficulty associated with full understanding 
what the system is doing when passively monitoring it. 
To reduce over-trust in the automation, and to increase detection of failures, 
shifting between manual and automatic control, according to the capabilities of the 
person and the situation, is considered effective. In a previous study, participants 
monitored an automated engine status display while performing a tracking and fuel 
management task. This multi-task flight simulation included adaptive automation that 
shifted the engine status monitoring task to the person for 10 minutes in one condition. In 
another condition, the monitoring task was automated during the entire experiment. The 
result showed that the 10 minutes in manual control substantially improved subsequent 
detection of automation failures (Parasurman, Mouloua, & Molly, 1996). Passive tasks 
combined with the responsibility for other tasks seem to increase reliance on the 
automation. 
Gaps between Expectations and Automation Behavior 
A discrepancy between the operator's expectations and the behavior of the 
automation system can undermine trust even when the automation performs well 
(Rasmussen, Pejterson, & Goodstein, (1994). There is no single level of reliability that 
can be identified that will lead to distrust and disuse. It is possible to determine that trust 
depends on the timing, consequence, and expectations associated with failures of the 
automation. The environmental context not only influences trust and reliance, but also 
influences the performance of the automation. For example, the automation may perform 
well in certain circumstances and not in others. Therefore, appropriateness of trust often 
depends on how sensitive people are to the influence of the environment on the 
performance of the automation. Trust is considered more than a simple reflection of the 
performance of the automation. For example, appropriate trust depends on the operators' 
understanding of how the context affects the capability of the automation (Lee & See, 
2004). 
Appropriate Trust: Trust and System Capability 
Inappropriate reliance associated with misuse and disuse may depend on how 
well trust matches the true capabilities of the automation (Lee & See, 2004). Appropriate 
trust is critical for appropriate system operation. Figure 2 indicates the matches and 
mismatches between trust and capability of automation systems. Calibration indicates the 
correspondence between a person's trust in the automation and the automation's 
capabilities (Lee & Moray, 1994; Muir, 1987). In figure 2, the diagonal line represents 
the good calibration. Above this line is over trust, and below it is distrust. There is good 
calibration when the level of trust matches automation capabilities. Overtrust indicates 
poor calibration when trust exceeds system capabilities. On the other hand, distrust is 
indicated when trust falls short of the automation's capabilities. Resolution refers to how 
precisely a judgment of trust differentiates levels of automation capability (Lee & See, 
2004; Cohen et al., 1999). Figure 2 shows that poor resolution occurs when an operator's 
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trust level is very low with a large range of automation capability, when levels of trust 
and system capability are not equal. 
Good calibration and good resolution of trust can mitigate misuse and disuse of 
automation (Lee & See 2006). Pilots also need to be able to adjust their knowledge 
associated with system capability by experience. Systems' capability may change in 
different circumstances such as time, weather, and maintenance; thus the pilots' trust and 
their knowledge of system capability may need to be adjustable. 
Trust 
Good resolution: A rang© of 
system capabiity maps onto 
the sama range of trust 
Overtrust: Trust exceeds 
system capacities, 
ileadirtg to mteuse Calibrated trust Trust 
matches system capacities, 
leading to appropriate use 
Distrust: Trust faSs short 
of system capabilities, 
leading to disuse 
Poor resolution: A la*g© rang© 
of system capability maps onto 
a smal range of trust 
Automation capability 
(trustworthiness} 
Figure2. Model of Appropriate Trust in Automation (The Relationship among 
Calibration, Resolution, and Automation Capability in Defining by Lee & See, 2004) 
Measurement of Trust between Human and Machine 
In order to understand the concept of trust in automation systems, it is important 
to measure trust effectively. Trust was studied mostly in the field of social psychology 
(Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000). Lazelere and Huston (1980) analyzed trust regarding 
benevolence and honesty in partners. The researchers found several factors of trust 
including such concepts as predictability, reliability, and dependability. Lazelere and 
Huston concluded that these factors may be dynamic, changing over time as relationships 
develop (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 200). 
Lee and Moray (1994) and Muir and Moray (1996) examined operators' trust in 
automated systems in a simulated supervisory process control task. They then constructed 
a subjective rating scale to evaluate participants' perceptions of the reliability and 
trustworthiness of the automated systems. Only a few trust studies between human and 
automation systems have been done, and the questionnaires were based in part on those 
studies used in the social psychology research on trust (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000). 
One assertion of the previous studies of trust is that trust is a multidimensional 
concept (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000 p. 54). The questionnaires in the previous studies 
differ in that some are designed to measure trust in a particular person or system, whereas 
others measure a more general propensity toward trusting (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000). 
For example, theoretical notions of trust in a romantic partner may be completely 
different from the trust between human and machine. Jian, Bisantz, and Drury (2000) 
argued that in previous research the questionnaires used to measure trust have included 
items based on different theoretical notions of trust, not based on an empirical analysis 
that attempts to understand multiple components of trust. Thus, in their study, they 
focused on trust between human and automation systems to evaluate how trust between 
humans and automated systems differed from trust between humans, or for that matter, 
from trust in general. Additionally, they attempted to identify potential similarities and 
differences among concepts of general trust, trust between people, and trust between 
humans and an automated system. 
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Their research concluded: (a) trust and distrust can be treated as opposites, and it 
is not necessary to differentiate between high and low levels of trust and high and low 
levels of distrust; (b) three types of trust, general trust, human- to -human trust, and 
human and machine trust, tended to be similar (it is unnecessary to measure them 
separately). Based on these two results, the researchers proposed and developed a scale 
for measuring trust between humans and machines. 
The questionnaire developed by Jian, Bisantz, and Drury (2000) may be useful 
to investigate the relationships between pilots' trust and their performance in an aircraft. 
The questionnaire was created using word selections most related to trust. Results 
indicated that the three categories of trust were undistinguishable, having no significant 
bearing on data; hence, social-psychology-based questionnaires are still applicable to 
measure trust between humans and machines. The questionnaire was developed 
empirically to observe the differences across the three categories, and especially to 
measure trust between human and automation systems. Thus, in this paper the 
questionnaire of trust between human and automation uses an instrument that was 
produced by well- published authors in the field and has been used by others as a reliable 
measurement. Given the importance of trust, overtrust or undertrust in human interaction 
with technology, it is equally important but very difficult to measure trust. Wickens and 
Xu (2002) argue that trust is a psychological state and only be measured subjectively. 
There are multiple ratings scales for trust (Madson, et al., 2002; Jian, Bisantz, Drury, 
2000) and scales developed specifically for human interaction with computers (Muir and 
Moray, 1996). The point is that several rating scales have been developed. The tool 
used here was selected because it had a precedent in the literature and was based on 
empirical data collected in the transportation industry. 
Situational Awareness 
According to Ensley (1995), 88% of accidents among major airlines involving 
human errors could be attributed to problems with situational awareness as opposed to 
problems with decision-making or flight skills. The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) determined situational awareness as one of seven major task 
areas targeted for human error reduction in its Aviation Safety Program, in compliance 
with the government's goal of reducing fatal aircraft crashes by 80% over the next ten 
years (Huettner & Lewis, 1997). Reduction of accidents in general aviation may 
contribute substantially towards the overall goal of reducing aircraft accidents. 
Furthermore, focusing on improvement of situational awareness will contribute towards 
improving overall safety as these aircraft share the same congested airport areas, runways 
and en route environment with commercial aircraft (Endsley et al., 2000). 
In a previous study of pilot-situational awareness, automation system related 
problems have been taken as a good examples of commission and omission errors. For 
example, the flight management systems (FMSs) provide pilots with a considerable 
amount of flight path information. This flight path information includes the predicted 
path, the relative position of adjacent navigation aids, airports, adverse weather activity, 
as well as the location in space at which the intersection of a constant rate climb or 
descent reaches a predetermined altitude. As long as the operators are careful during 
course programming and setting, they can be confident that the performance of the 
navigation system will be accurate (Endsley & Strauch, 1997). The authors also argued 
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that the system can actually decrease pilots' awareness of parameters critical to flight 
path control through the out-of-the-loop performance decrements, over-reliance on 
automation, and poor human monitoring capabilities. Many studies show that in most 
cases operators are unaware of automation failures and do not detect critical system state 
changes when acting as monitors of automated systems (Ephrath & Young, 1981; Kessel 
&Wickens, 1982; Wickens & Kessel, 1979; Young, 1969). 
Achieving a satisfactory level of pilot-situational awareness is a critical and 
challenging aspect in many industries (Endsley, 1996). It is also central to good decision 
making and performance (Endsley & Strauch, 1997). According to Hartel, Smith, and 
Prince (1991), poor situational awareness is a leading causal factor in military aviation 
mishaps. In a recent commercial aviation review, 88% of human error-related problems 
involved situational awareness issues (Endsley, 1994). 
Situational awareness is formally defined as "the perception of the elements in 
the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning 
and the projection of their status in the near future (Endsley, 1988 p.4)." Essentially, 
situational awareness means that pilots need to be aware of what is happening around 
them and understand what that information means to them now and in the future 
(Endsley, 2003). The automation systems and other aircraft operation systems such as the 
instruments in traditional aircraft are great indications of what is happening inside and 
outside of the aircraft; thus, effective monitoring of those systems is a critical task to 
maintain high situational awareness. 
As is depicted in Figure 1,there are three main levels of situational awareness: 
perception of the elements in the environment (Level 1), comprehension of the current 
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situation (Level 2), and, at the highest level, projection of future status (Level 3) 
(Endsley, 2003). For example, a pilot needs to recognize important elements such as 
other aircraft, weather, terrain, and system states, along with their relevant characteristics 
at Level 1 situational awareness (Endsley, 1997). In single pilot operation, keeping up 
with all the relevant system and flight data, other data and navigational data can be quite 
difficult to handle. Some pilots may lose their situational awareness in this stage. At 
Level 2 a pilot needs to be aware of the elements that are present and be able to 
understand the meaning of the critical factors (Endsley, 1997). At Level 3 situational 
awareness a pilot needs to be able to project what will happen at least in the very near 
future. This is achieved through both Level 1 and Level 2 (Endsley, 1997). It is important 
to maintain the balance of all the levels. This level of situational awareness is critical for 































Figure3. Pilot Decision Making Model by Endsley (1990) 
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As part of single pilot resource management (SRM), it is critical for a single 
pilot to maintain Level 1 to respond effectively and efficiently in the next two levels of 
situational awareness. Pilots always have to be aware of what their on-board systems are 
doing, their own location and the location of important reference points and terrain, and 
the location of other aircraft along with relevant flight parameters and characteristics. It is 
essential to have good Level 1 situational awareness; however, much depends on how the 
pilots interpret the information they take in (Level 2). At Level 2, depending on how a 
pilot interprets, situations may be greatly changed. Pilots would be required to sense that 
a certain pattern of flight parameters indicates when they are near stall point or when the 
displayed altitude is below their assigned altitude (Endsley, 1996). At the highest level, 
Level 3 situational awareness, pilots comprehend the state of the system and predict its 
state in the near future. With accurate and complete situation awareness, pilots can use 
the systems effectively to meet their goals (Endsley, 1996). 
Automation may directly impact a pilot's situation awareness through the 
following three major factors: changes in vigilance and complacency associated with 
monitoring, assumption of a passive instead of an active role in controlling the system, 
and changes in the quality or form of feedback provided to the human operator (Endsley 
& Kiris, in press; Endsley, 1996). Each of these factors can lead to the out-of-the-loop 
performance problem. 
Enemies of Situational Awareness 
Good situational awareness is challenging due to features of both the human 
information processing system and of complex domains (Endsley, Bolte & Jones, 2003). 
The out-of the-loop syndrome could be the most critical factor. Automation systems help 
pilots to eliminate excessive workload, but the systems also can act to lower situational 
awareness. The automation system complexity and mode errors, which can result when 
people mistakenly believe the system is in one mode when it is not, are situational 
awareness demons that relate to automation. In addition, automation can undermine 
situational awareness by taking people out-of-the-loop. In this state they develop poor 
situational awareness on both how the automation is performing and how the automation 
is supposed to be controlling (Endsley, Bolte & Jones, 2003). 
Having bias on automation systems would be a critical obstacle to maintaining a 
high level of situational awareness. This bias may also lead the pilots to be 
out-of-the-loop. Human operators have a limited ability to detect automation failures or 
problems and to understand the state of the systems sufficiently to allow them to take 
over operations manually when needed (Endsley, Bolte & Jones, 2003). 
Being out-of-the loop may not be a problem when the automation systems are 
performing properly; however, when the automation fails or, more frequently, reaches 
situational conditions it is not equipped to handle, the person is out of the loop and often 
unable to detect the problem, properly interpret the information presented, or intervene in 
a timely manner (Endsley, Bolte & Jones, 2003). People are often slow to detect a 
problem with an automated system (Ephrath & Young, 1981; Kessel & Wickens & 
Kessel, 1979; Young, 1969; Endsley, Bolte & Jones, 2003). In general aviation, pilots 
will expect flying with a moderate level of automation. Operators sometimes may decide 
to neglect the automated system, and the system parameters may be misunderstood by the 
automation in favor of other tasks through a shifting of attention (Parasurman, Mouloua, 
&Molloy, 1994; Endsley, 1996). 
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Single-pilot Resource Management 
Single-pilot Resource Management (SRM) is one of the important FITS training 
program's criteria. FITS defines SRM as "the art and science of single pilot management 
of all the available resources to ensure that the successful outcome of the flight is never in 
doubt" (FAA/Industry Training Standards, 2004). Flying with fully automated aircraft 
might be helpful for a single pilot operation; however, automation fails from time to time. 
Furthermore, automation systems can decrease a pilot's situational awareness. As part of 
single resource management, pilots will be required to have a skill to manage all the 
resources inside and outside the cockpit. In order to carry out efficient and effective 
Level 2 and 3 situational awareness, a pilot must receive SRM training. 
FITS's for SRM criteria includes primary emphasis on integrating the 
development and enhancement of the mental process and underlying thinking skills 
needed by the pilot to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a 
given set of circumstances (FAA/Industry Training Standards, 2004). Dealing with 
automated systems involves an operator's trust. Therefore, it is important to focus on the 
operator's mental processes in addition to developing their operation skills. 
Understanding and addressing pilots' mental processes to SRM training may be difficult, 
but it cannot be disregarded. 
Aeronautical Decision-Making 
Decision-making is one of the important cognitive tasks. Decision-making is 
considered as the act of choosing between alternatives under conditions of uncertainty 
(Tsang &Vidulich, 2003). Automation systems are introduced as aids to help pilots' 
cognitive tasks; however, the systems provide decision-makers with new guidelines or 
shortcuts for decision-making and task performance (Mosier, Skitka, Heers, & Buradick, 
1998). These systems lead to potential problems. 
Pilots tend to relay upon probabilistic information to evaluate what they cannot 
access directly (Wickens & Flach, 1998). NASA Ames' experiment of automation bias 
(1989) found that automated cues can curtail information searches. During the take-off 
roll, crews received contradictory fire indication. An automated-sensing electronic 
checklist suggested shutting down the #1 engine which was supposedly on fire. However, 
traditional engine parameters indicated that the #1 engine quickly recovered and the #2 
engine was actually more severely damaged. The result indicated that 75% of the crew in 
the automated condition shut down the #1 engine, and only 25 % who used the traditional 
paper checklist and non-automated aids did likewise. The study concluded that the crews 
in automated condition tended to discuss much less information before deciding whether 
to shut down the engine (Mosier, Skitka, Heers, & Burdick, 1998). Automation aids are 
greatly advanced; however, human operators still remain in control. 
According to Endsley, Jones and Bolte (2003), situational awareness is the key 
factor driving the decision-making process. In complex and dynamic environments such 
as flying with automated systems, decision-making is highly dependent on situational 
awareness (Endsley, Bolte, & Jones, 2003). Automated aids change the way pilots 
perform tasks and make decisions (Mosier, Skitka, Heers, & Burdick, 1998), and lead 
pilots to create different levels of errors. Misuse and misinterpretation of the automation 
systems are still expected to occur in Technically Advanced Aircraft. These errors need 
to be evaluated and reduced. 
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Automation Cockpit 
A significant difference between TAA and traditional aircraft is cockpit 
automation. While there are critical disadvantages of automation, automation is still 
essential for aviation safety. There are many advantages with automated aircraft. 
According to Wiener (1988), automation increased capacity and productivity, reducing of 
manual workload and fatigue, relief from routine operation, relief from small errors, more 
precise handling of routine operations, economical utilization of machines, and damping 
of individual differences. 
According to Wiener (1988), cockpit automation seems a great boon to safety, 
removing human error at its source and replacing fallible humans with virtually unerring 
machines. On the other hand, the critics view automation as a threat to safety replacing 
intelligent human with devices that are both dumb and dutiful. This is a deadly 
combination. The digital systems seem to invite new forms of human error in their 
operation, often leading to gross blunders rather than the relatively minor errors which 
characterize traditional system. Furthermore, the equipment does not appear to live up to 
its expectations in reducing crew workload or increasing time available for extra-cockpit 
scanning (Curry, 1985; Wiener, 1985), since while the manual tasks may be declining, 
monitoring and mental workload have increased (Wiener, 1988). 
Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) 
Fracker (1991 a;b;c), Sarter and Woods (1994), and Vidulich (1992) classify 
measurement of situational awareness into the following categories; subjective, explicit, 
and implicit measures (Dennehy,1996). Subjective is one technique that has been used to 
ask pilots to rate their situational awareness on a Likert scale. Since they are not aware of 
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what is really happening in the environment, their ability to estimate their own situational 
awareness may not be effective. The pilots may think that they have perfect situational 
awareness until they encounter some problems (Endsley, 1988). Furthermore, when a 
pilot is asked to subjectively evaluate his/her situational awareness in a debriefing, 
his/her rating may tend to be positive. Because this information is gathered after the run, 
the pilot will probably not be able to recall, and thus he/she will over generalize about 
his/her situational awareness (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
A detailed questionnaire could be administered after the completion of each run. 
The pilots may have enough time to respond to a lengthy and detailed list of questions. 
There are several disadvantages. People in general are not good at recalling past mental 
events, even recent ones. The best way to ask pilots to recall their accurate mental events 
is to ask the pilots about their situational awareness while they are flying. Furthermore, 
asking the pilots questions also giving them hints to the requested information on their 
displays, thus altering their true situational awareness (Endsley, 1988). 
An implicit measure of situational awareness would assess the influence of 
specific events on performance (Fracker, 1991a). The goal is to determine whether pilots' 
mission performance has been influenced appropriately by the occurrence of specific 
events. Signal Detection Theory is one example to determine how people make decisions 
about uncertain events (Dennehy, 1996). In the present study, this technique is not 
applicable. 
An explicit measure requires a pilot to report what he/she explicitly remembers in 
order that his/her situation awareness might be measured (Dennehy, 1996). An example 
of explicit concurrent measures is Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique 
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(SAGAT) developed by Endsley (1987). SAGAT has achieved a high degree of validity 
and respect for specific military uses, for instance, in the air-to-air fighter cockpit. 
SAGAT measures a pilot's situational awareness in the following manner: a pilot flies a 
given mission scenario using a given aircraft system, during which, at a random time, the 
simulation is halted by a blinking light on the simulator display. The pilot is asked a 
series of questions in order to determine his or her knowledge of the current situation. 
The queries include all operator situational awareness requirements, including Level 1 
(perception of data), Level 2 (comprehensions of meaning), and Level 3 (projection of 
the near future) components. Their answers are evaluated on the basis of what was 
actually happening in the simulation. Then the score is typically stratified into three 
zones- immediate, intermediate, and long range, in order to provide a better picture of 
pilots' situation awareness (Endsley, 1988). 
The SAGAT enables situational awareness evaluators to: (a) provide a current 
"snapshot" of the pilot's mental model of the situation, thus reducing the effects of 
collecting data after the event; (b) directly measure the pilot's knowledge of the situation, 
his situational awareness; (c) objectively collect and, for the most part, objectively 
evaluate and (d) possess direct face validity (Endsley, 1988). 
The primary limitation of SAGAT is that the simulation needs to be halted to 
collect the data. Sarter and Woods (1991; 1994) suggest that this methodology does not 
provide data about natural character and occurrence of situational awareness (Dennehy, 
1998). 
In this study, SAGAT is used during real time flight. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University (ERAU) pilot-students' instructors conducted the SAGAT interview during a 
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flight. Instead of halting the flight at a certain point, the instructors took a moment to 
ask their students, using provided situational awareness in the questions middle of the 
flight, typical SA questions generated by a subject matter expert. This technique allows 
data collection in actual flight training situation without alerting the students that their 
situational awareness is going to be evaluated. Furthermore, the instructors evaluated 
their students' situational awareness after the flight using a provided check-list. 
Since the researcher anticipate that student pilots who have higher levels of 
trust will not be paying as much attention to their instruments as persons with less trust, 
the researcher expect the higher the trust the lower the situational awareness (SAGAT) 
score. If a pilot is over-reliant on a particular system, his or her situational awareness 
may suffer; vice versa, a lack of trust (distrust) may cause him or her to disregard 
information critical to his or her situational awareness. 
Hypothesis 
It is hypothesized that: (a) pilots who have high scores on the trust scale will 
have low situational awareness during the flight; (b) pilots who have low scores on the 





The first purpose of the experiment was to determine the shape of the sampling 
distribution as a result of the Jian's original and modified vision of Trust Scale in student 
pilots and to compare their results with non-pilots (Study I). The second purpose of the 
study was to calculate a trust score from a subsequent group of student pilots and to 
compare those scores with their situational awareness score during a simulated flight 
exercise (Study II). Non-parametric statistical evaluations of the results were used to 
determine the relationship between the trust score of student pilots and their 
corresponding instructor based situational awareness score. 
Study I: Jian's Trust Survey 
Participants 
A total of 150 ERAU students who were attending the Spring Semester (2006), 
including 47 students from Human Factors classes and another 103 students from the 
Aeronautical Science (AS) 132 Basic Aeronautics I, 133 Basic Aeronautics II, 232 
Intermediate Aeronautics, and 272 Advanced Aeronautics participated in the Jian's 
original questionnaire. The 150 students could be further distinguished into 111 pilots 
(with more than 35 total flight hours) and 39 non-pilots (less than 31 total flight hours, 
including seven students who had zero flight hours). 
Then, the modified trust survey tested 88 pilots who were attending AS 133, AS 
232, and AS 272 during the summer semester (2006). Only ERAU student pilots 
participated in the modified trust survey. The researcher used pilots from the private 
rating course (AS 133), the instrument rating course (AS 232), and the commercial rating 
course (AS 272) in order to have a chance to use the same candidates for the FTD testing 
later. They participated in this questionnaire type survey that measured student pilots' 
trust level using the edited trust scale. 
Procedures 
The trust scales developed by Jian, Bisantz, & Drury: (2000) including their 
original and modified versions, were used to survey the ERAU student pilots' trust levels. 
This scale was selected because it was one of only two studies found which formulated a 
trust score based on empirical data and the only one to have been used by other 
researchers. The Jian's trust scale is a seven-point Likert scaled questionnaire, with 
higher scores corresponding to higher trust levels, and lower scores corresponding to 
lower levels of trust. A copy of the Jian's Scale is included in Appendix A. Due to 
complaints from participants in the Jian's original trust survey some of the wording on 
this questionnaire was changed. Hopefully, the meaning of the questions was unaltered 
The modified version is included in Appendix A for comparison. It can be seen that 
questions 1-5 in both versions asked the pilots what might be considered negative 
questions, questions that are phrased in the negative. These were designated 
"Worrisome" questions. Questions 6-12 asked the pilots their feelings about 
technological systems in what were considered a positive manner, so were considered 
"Non-Worrisome questions". 
The researcher and the professors who were teaching AS132, AS133, and AS 
232 handed out the survey, and gave a brief statement describing the purpose of the 
survey before their class period began. They were then asked to complete their survey 
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anonymously and return it to the investigator in the back of the room. Most surveys took 
approximately 3 minutes to complete. These were scored by hand using the technique 
described in Jian (et al., 2000) and analyzed using SPSS statistical evaluation software 
(ver.12). 
Study II: Evaluation of Trust survey and Situational Awareness 
Participants 
A total of 30 students working on their single/multi engine private (FA 133S/M), 
single/multi engine instrument (FA 195D/232), and commercial ratings (FA 272), 
assigned for a dual flight session (instructor accompanied flight) in the FTD simulator, 
were selected from the list of those entering the FTD for training. They were asked to 
sign the volunteer sheet, and were further separated into categories. 30 students were 
working on their single/multi engine private ratings, 15 students were working on their 
single/multi engine instrument ratings and 5 students were working on their commercial 
ratings. The students who participated in this experiment received the FTD flight portion 
of their regular pilot training curriculum in a Frasca Cessna-172 aircraft fixed-base Flight 
Training Device (FTD) located in ERAU's Center for Advanced Simulation. The 
students were asked to volunteer for Study II by signing a list before their FTD flight 
began. Their flight instructor was asked, during the lesson, to rate the student for their 
situational awareness during one of their required flight modules in the FTD. Neither 
instructor nor student pilots were remunerated for their participation and they were never 
asked to do anything during their flight training that would be considered unusual for 
their flight training. For the SAGAT scores, a subject matter expert familiar with SAGAT 
procedures was enlisted to come up with questions for the FTD flight module that were 
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considered to be consistent with the student flight training and consistent with good 
situational awareness. These questions are listed in Appendix B. The trust data were 
compared with the students' situational awareness scores to determine the strength of the 
relationship between the pilots' trust levels and their level of situational awareness. 
Materials 
The subject matter expert, a professor from Aeronautical Science Department, 
developed the situational awareness evaluation questions based on ERAU's FTD module 
39, electrical failure in departure phase and the FTD module 221, engine failure for multi 
engine. The electrical failure exercise was considered as the most suitable to evaluate the 
relationships between the students' situational awareness and their reliance on the 
instrument panels since the responses showed the most variability in response. Engine 
failure exercise also is a common exercise in the FTD, so the engine failure scenario was 
also used to evaluate situational awareness. 
In order to meet the convenience of the instructors and to fit into the one hour of 
FTD training paid for by the students, there were only six situational awareness questions 
developed. As is typical of the SAGAT method of assessment of situational awareness, 
there were three types or levels of questions: perception (Level 1), comprehension (Level 
2), and projection (Level 3). There were two questions for each level and the format used 
by the instructor pilot who delivered the questions is shown in the form on Appendix 3. 
The first question was 'how long will battery power last'? (Level 1). Do you need to 
load-shed (Level 1)?; where are you on the departure procedures (Level 2)?; do you call 
ATC and advise of the failure (Level 2?); what systems are affected by an electrical 
system failure (Level 3)?; and how will performance data be affected (Level 3)?. The 
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engine failure scenario has also two questions in each level and totals six questions: did 
you follow all steps in appropriate checklist (Level 1)?; how did you compensate for 
rudder (Level 1)?; what is happening aerodynamically to aircraft on one engine (Level 
2)?; What are aircraft limitations on one engine (Level 2)?; What are things to consider 
when landing with one engine inoperative (Level 3)?; and in current flight conditions, 
where would you elect to land (Level 3)? 
Procedures 
The students who were working on their single/multi engine private (FA 
133S/M), single/multi engine instrument (FA 195D/232), and commercial ratings (FA 
272), and assigned for a dual flight session (instructor accompanied flight) in the FTD 
simulator were selected from the list of those who were entering the FTD for training and 
asked to sign the volunteer sheet. Their instructors automatically became their situational 
awareness evaluators. Before their FTD training, the students were asked to fill out the 
trust questionnaire to determine the students' trust levels. 
The flight instructors were given the situational awareness evaluation sheet with 
an instruction in order to conduct the SAGAT procedure. Typically, the same flight 
instructor had multiple students who volunteered so SAGAT training was needed only 
once. They were told their data will be kept confidential and anonymous by the project 
investigator. The instructors conducted the SAGAT during the training; at a certain point, 
the instructors posed the six situational awareness questions. The students were not given 
any hints from the instrument panel, Pilot Operation Manual, Pilot Operation Handbook, 
check-list, or their instructors. The instructors evaluated the students' answers as either 
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correct or incorrect. The Electrical failure scenario was successfully collected from 23 




Study I: Jian's Trust Survey 
The descriptive statistics results from Jian's original trust survey (Appendix Al) 
are indicated in table 2. The trust scores using the Jian's original version between pilots, 
n = 111 who had more than 35 total flight hours were compared to non-pilots, n = 39 who 
had less than 31 total flight hours and they were not significantly different. These results 
allowed the pilots' scores to be combined with the non-pilots scores to increase the 
sample size for the trust scale. Figure 4 shows the distribution from the 149 participants 
who attended in Jian's original trust survey in Study I. 
Some of the questions were reworded in the original questionnaire because of 
complaints from participants in Study I. Every effort was made to keep the meaning of 
the few questions that were changed (Appendix A2) while making the question clearer. 
The descriptive statistics results from Jian's modified trust survey are indicated in table 3. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution from the 85 student pilots who participated in Jian's 
modified trust survey in Study I. The data from these 85 student pilots were used to 
determine the high and low trust scores. Figure 5 was visually analyzed to determine the 
shape of the distribution and to give the project investigator experience with the trust 
scale and interpreting the numbers. The trust score associated with the upper 20 % of the 
distribution (-75) and that for the lower 20% of the distribution (-45) were used to set 
the high and low trust scores, respectively in Study II. 
Table 2 
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Figure 4. Histogram of Original Trust Survey Results for Study I (Pilots and non-pilots 
were not different so were combined. Trust score is on the X axis) 
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Figure 5. Histogram of Modified Trust Survey Results for Study I 
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Study II: Evaluation of Trust and Situational Awareness 
Trust scale and their flight experience 
There were 30 participants who were used in the Study II analysis. Only 19 
students of these 30 provided their VFR, IFR and Glass cockpit flight experience hours. 
The mean VFR flight hours was M = 98.05, IFR hours1 mean was M = 15 hours, and the 
glass cockpit experience hours' mean was M = 0.26 hours. 
Situational Awareness Evaluation 
There were six participants evaluated using the engine failure scenario, while 23 
students were evaluated using the electric failure scenario for situational awareness. A 
Mann-Whitney Test was conducted to determine if there were any significant differences 
between the two different situational awareness scenarios. Each level of the situational 
awareness scores was graded to determine the number of correct answers of the two 
questions at each level. If a student had two correct answers out of two questions, they 
were scored two. The scores from each level were added in the end (max is 6) to get the 
totals used in the statistical analysis. Six participants' data were randomly selected, 
through the use of a random number generator, from the 23 Electrical failure scenarios to 
equalize the number of the students who used the engine failure scenario. 
The test statistics show that the two different scenarios had no significant 
differences (U= 12; p<0.138). Thus the data from the two different scenarios were 
combined, and analyzed to observe further correlations. 
Figure 4 shows the total situational awareness and trust among three different 
groups, private, instrument, and commercial ratings. As the pilots go upper levels ratings, 
trust levels seemed be higher. 
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Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Figure 6. Histogram of Situational Awareness Scores (for each of the 3 SA levels (x axis) 
for the participants in Study II) 
Kruskal-Wallis Tests were run to determine if differences existed among the 
many classes from which students were drawn for the study (FA 133, 232, 295 and 272) 
in the three different SA levels. There were eight students in FA 133 private pilot rating 
class, five students in FA 233 multi-engine instrument rating class, and ten students in FA 
295 the single-engine instrument rating class, and six students in FA 272 the commercial 
rating. Figure 6 shows that in Level 1 (perception), those FA 272 students who were 
working on multi-engine commercial ratings performed better than the other flight ratings 
(private or instrument) using a Kruskal-Wallis test (p<0.039). 
Trust vs. Situational Awareness 
In order to investigate the relationships between the students' situational 
awareness and their trust levels, ordinal regression analysis also was conducted. This 
regression model was not significant (p<0.31) so there does not seem to be a good fit for 
overall trust related to overall situational awareness scores. However, in examining the 
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ordinal regression table of parameter estimates, it was noticed that there were several 
significant results between the high and low trust scores and situational awareness scores. 
When the trust scores were low (35-45 range), significance levels were less than 0.01 and 
strongly correlated to situational awareness scores. The two highest trust scores (8land 
82) also showed a strong relationship to situational awareness scores (p<0.01). These data 
are suggested by the graph in Figure 7. 
































Figure 7. Average Trust vs. SA (A high SA score is associated with a high trust score. 




This study was conducted to evaluate the relationship between trust and 
situational awareness in student pilots. The results of relating situational awareness to 
trust level did not support the original hypothesis at first. It was expected that high-trust 
pilots would have lower situational awareness, and low-trust pilots would have higher 
situational awareness. Instead, the reverse was found, high-trust pilots actually had higher 
situational awareness and low-trust pilots had lower situational awareness. The original 
hypothesis was based on the concept that existed in the literature. Novice operators 
tended to put too much reliance on technology. Since novice pilots are using many new 
instruments they may experience the bias to trust their equipment unquestioningly. It was 
felt that the untrusting pilot would need to continually update their situational awareness 
and examine many instruments; hence have a better overall situational awareness. The 
trusting pilot might be more inclined to pay less attention to instruments if they were 
perceived as reliable and unfailing and hence not pay as much attention to their 
situational awareness. That this was not the case suggests to the author that the high trust 
pilots were not blindly trusting their instruments but using them to establish a good 
situational awareness. The low trust pilots in this new view could be under scrutinizing 
their equipment and hence experience a low situational awareness. These results suggest 
the Embry-Riddle student pilots did not blindingly trust their instruments, but rather they 
trusted them intelligently. In other words, the ERAU students tended to know in detail 
about their aircraft systems and had reason to trust them. Smilar findings exist in the 
medical realm (Wiegmann, et al, 2001) in which subjective assessment of trust and error 
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rate were related with personnel who tended to trust their equipment more were 
nonetheless sensitive to the information reliability. 
There were three main stages to this study. The first two stages studied the 
application of the Jian Trust Scale, the original and the edited version, to understand the 
dynamics of the distribution of trust as measured by the scale and to determine how to 
identify high-trust and low-trust pilots. The third topic was to apply the trust scale of 
pilots' to their situational awareness levels. The two different scenarios, the electrical and 
the engine failure scenarios, were used to evaluate situational awareness. 
In stage one, the original trust scale developed by Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, (2000) 
was used to generalize the idea of the participants' trust. However, the participants' 
response was not effective, and many students reported that the questions were difficult 
to understand. Thus, in stage two the original trust scale's wording was changed slightly. 
In stage three, finally the trust data and the situational awareness scores from 29 
students were compared. First of all the Kruskal- Wallis test was run to observe if there 
were significant differences in situational awareness levels among the three different 
groups: private, instrument, and commercial ratings. SA level 1 showed significance for 
the more experienced commercial pilots. The students who were working on their private 
ratings had the lowest rank among the other two ratings, instrument and commercial 
ratings. Over all, the students who were working on their instrument rating and above had 
better situational awareness. 
An Ordinal Regression analysis revealed the unexpected finding that high-trust 
scores yielded higher situational awareness and low-trust scores yielded lower situation 
awareness. 
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This trust scale will be an effective tool to measure student-pilots situational 
awareness. Trust scores, especially high scores, may indicate that the students have good 
situational awareness. Alternatively, lower or middle trust scores may demonstrate that 
students need to improve their situational awareness. The trust scale seemed to be 
effective in measuring a psychological concept that might be called "trust" in technology. 
Though this concept could distinguish among the pilots' trust levels, their trust also may 
change based on several factors such as workload, self-confidence, and mood may be at 
play. Thus, it may be impossible to measure the pilots' trust/intention/willingness in a 
current situation using questionnaires or scales. 
Finally, the participants who volunteered in this study may not have been 
effective. Though the research results had interesting results among the three different 
ratings, their piloting skills could be unstable and immature. Their trust levels may be 
also unstable because their piloting skills and knowledge are still developing. Perhaps 
different results would be obtained with more experienced pilots. 
From these results, it may be possible to measure pilots' trust in automated 
aircraft by investigating "human out of the loop syndrome;" and distinguish between 
pilots' situational awareness and reliance. The Cessna 172 in the FTD was equipped with 
the traditional "six-pack", and the pilots were practicing manual flight in the FTD. Pilots 
trusting in everything (not only automation systems but also traditional instrument, 
check-list, ATC, etc) could also influence their situational awareness. However, reliance 
levels on the automation systems may be greater than reliance levels on any other 
traditional instruments or navigation systems because automation systems such as 
auto-pilot, GPS, FMS, etc may easily lead to a pilot out of the loop syndrome. 
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The interesting results may support the use of a ground based questionnaire to 
evaluate trust in pilots. Low trusting pilots could be advised that they needed to scrutinize 
and trust their equipment better in order to increase their SA. Pilots who rated low on the 
trust dimension might need more encouragement to make better use of their reading of 
instruments. Other high technology occupations could benefit from a tool that can 
accurately assess trust. Overtrusters and undertrusters can be advised accordingly. It is 
recommended that additional funding be made available to allow the pursuit of the 
positive results of this study and develop a trust assessment tool that is geared towards 
the pilot and aviation. The results of this study argue that such a tool might have 
important use in identifying which student needs to learn more about their instruments in 




In conclusion, this research has revealed that pilots' trust and their situational 
awareness are correlated. The pilots who had high trust scores seemed to have high 
situational awareness of their flight surroundings. Alternatively lower or middle trust 
scoring pilots may need to improve their situational awareness by putting more reliance 
on their instruments. 
The results obtained from the experiments possibly indicate that the participants 
had an effective balance between the levels of trust and self-confidence. They may have 
had higher trust on the aircraft operation systems than self-confidence, which in turn, 
may moderate their reliance on the systems. Thus, the high-trust pilots may have kept 
high situational awareness due to a better balance of trust and self confidence. 
With regards to automation, the view of many authors cited in this work bears 
repeating that advanced computer systems, particularly for systems where overconfidence 
or overtrust or overreliance could be involved, need to have a means to indicate system 
failure to alert the operator that the information is no longer valid. Guidelines have been 
developed that can lead to identifying which systems should be automated and to what 
extent to improve the interaction of humans with machines, of pilots with technically 
advanced aircraft for example (Parasuraman, Sheridan, Wickens, 2000). The usefulness 
of alerting pilots to failed or incorrect instruments is evident in studies that show pilots 
quickly notice failed instrument cues and learn to find other means to get the information 





This study revealed that ground based trust measurements were able to predict a 
pilots' situational awareness in flight, at the extremes of high and low trust. Therefore the 
Jian trust scale might be an effective and convenient tool to predict pilots' situational 
awareness before flight training. This researcher recommends that a trust scale be used to 
assess pilots' situational awareness early on in training. Trust scores, especially high 
scores, may indicate that the students have good situational awareness. Alternatively 
lower or middle trust scores may need to improve their situational awareness. Further 
study of trust will help establish a more effective prediction. 
Trust needs further investigation. Investigating how trust impacts situational 
awareness may be useful in this approach. For example, pilots' self-confidence and their 
complacency might influence trust appreciably. Approaching the trust investigation from 
those dimensions may help improve the trust scale. Many researchers determined trust as 
a willingness, behavior, and attitude that leads to an action of reliance. However, the 
components that make up trust or reliance are still not clear. There is a strong possibility 
self-confidence is influencing trust. Delegation is also a very interesting component 
which may influence the reliance action. 
In order to enhance human and aircraft operations, evaluation of situational 
awareness training also is important. Approaching the evaluation of situational awareness 
from an understanding of the role of trust seems fundamental. This type of approach is 
not common, but as this study's results indicate, there may be a significant relationship 
between trust and situational awareness. 
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In this study, situational awareness was measured in the FTD. The researcher 
presumes that these results will generalize to actual aircraft operation. Still, it would be 
beneficial to extend these results to actual aircraft flight. Many of the same methods 
outlined here could be employed. This researcher further recommends continued study in 
virtual flight and comparisons with actual flight to determine what, if any differences 
might exist. Many researchers indicated trust will have a greater influencing effect when 
a pilot is dealing with automation. The study of trust in automation aircraft would 
produce clearer results. 
This study also has implications for the FITS program. Pilots using advanced 
technology will make better use of that equipment if they trust it. This study argues that 
the use of high technology in aircraft will be successful in increasing the situational 
awareness of the novice pilot. It is recommended that novice pilots using glass 
instruments be assessed in their trust levels in order to gauge their likely situational 
awareness early in their training. 
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APPENDIX A 




ORIGINAL TRUST SCALE 
E-mail 
If you are a non pilot please put 0 (zero) in the hours categories below 
VFR hours IFR hours Glass hours 
Glass refers to PFD, MFD computerized displays 
Please mark the number on each line at the point which best describes your feeling or your impression For 
the purpose of this survey, "system" refers to the aircraft's systems, for example, the instruments, navigation 
system, autopilot, etc and what they tell you as a pilot IF YOU ARE A NON-PILOT, please consider that 
'system' refers to an automobile, i e what all the gauges and steering tell you as a driver 
PLEASE ANSWER AS CANDIDLY AS YOU CAN (Note not at all = 1 extremely =7) 
1 The system can be deceptive 
I I I i 
2 The system sometimes behaves in an unpredictable manner 
I i i i 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 I am often suspicious of the system's intent, action, or outputs 
I I i i 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 I am sometimes unsure of the system 
i i i I 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 The system's action can have a harmful or injurious outcome 
i 1 
6 I am confident in the system 
I i 
1 2 
7 The system can provide security 
I I 
1 2 
8 The system has integrity 
I I 
1 2 
9 The system is dependable 
l i 
1 2 
10 The system is consistant 
1 2 
11 I can trust the system 
I I 
1 2 
12 I am familiar with the system 
I L _ 
1 2 
Thank you for your participation! I 
APPENDIX A2 
MODIFIED TRUST SCALE 
Name E-mail 
If you are a non pilot please put 0 (zero) in the hours categories below 
VFR hours IFR hours Glass hours 
Glass refers to PFD, MFD computerized displays 
Please mark the number on each line at the point which best describes your feeling or your impression For 
the purpose of this survey, "system" refers to the aircraft's systems, for example, the instruments, navigation 
system, autopilot, etc and what they tell you as a pilot IF YOU ARE A NON-PILOT, please consider that 
'system' refers to an automobile, i e what all the gauges and steering tell you as a driver 
PLEASE ANSWER AS CANDIDLY AS YOU CAN (Note not at all = 1 extremely =7) 
1 The system can be deceptive 
I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 The system sometimes behaves in an unpredictable manner 
i i i i i i i 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I am often suspicious of the system's intent, action, or outputs 
i i i i i i i 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I am sometimes unsure of the system 
I I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 The system's action can have a harmful or injurious outcome 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I am confident in the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 The system can provide security 
i i i i i i i 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 The system has integrity 
i 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 The system is dependable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 The system is consistant 
i i i i i i i 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 I can trust the system 
I I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 I am familiar with the system 
I I I I I I I 
Thank you for your participation' I 
APPENDIX B 
Situational Awareness Evaluation Sheets 
Appendix Bl 
Situational Awareness Evaluation Sheet 
Electrical Failure (Departure Phase) 
Instructor's name Date 
Student's name Lesson 
Please evaluate your student's Situational Awareness (SA). To assess SA, the 
simulator is typically frozen for a few minutes and the student looks away from the 
instruments. You may ask those questions in different order, but do not give your 
student any hints. The questions are correct or incorrect. When you finish filling out 
this sheet, please put it in the box on the front desk. 
*This study is approved by Ivan Grau. Your name and data will be kept confidential. 
1. How long will battery power last? (Level 1) 
Correct Incorrect 
2. Do you need to load-shed? (Level 1) 
Correct Incorrect 
3. Where are you on the departure procedures? (Level 2) 
Correct Incorrect 
4. Do you call ATC and advise of the failure? (Level 2) 
Correct Incorrect 
5. What systems are affected by an electrical system failure? (Level 3) 
Correct Incorrect 
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Appendix B2 
Situational Awareness Evaluation Sheet 
Engine Failure 
Instructor's name Data 
Student's name Lesson 
Please evaluate your student's Situational Awareness (SA). To assess SA, the 
simulator is typically frozen for a few minutes and the student looks away from the 
instruments. You may ask those questions in different order, but do not give your 
student any hints. The questions are correct or incorrect. When you finish filling out 
this sheet, please put it in the box on the front desk. 
*This study is approved by Ivan Grau. Your name and data will be kept confidential. 
2. Did you follow all steps in appropriate checklist? (Level 1) 
Correct Incorrect 
3. How did you compensate for rudder? Foot pressure or rudder trim or combo? 
(Level 1) 
Correct Incorrect 
4. What are aircraft limitations on one engine? (Level 2) 
Correct Incorrect 
5. What is happening aerodynamically to aircraft on one engine? (Level 2) 
Correct Incorrect 
6. What are things to consider when landing with one engine inoperative? (Level 3) 
Correct Incorrect 
7. In current flight conditions, where would you elect to land? Or would you continue 
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